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The Turning-Point of Actium 
 
On September 2nd, 31 BCE, the naval forces of Octavian and his closest friend, Agrippa, clashed 
against the fleet of Marcus Antonius and Cleopatra. The location was the coast of Actium, an 
ancient town deemed sacred to Apollo which guarded the narrow strait eastward into the 
Ambracian Gulf. Initially, Antonius appeared to have the advantage of numbers on his side, 
outnumbering Octavian twice over with towering armoured ships; yet the major difficulty lay 
in filling them, and Antonius was forced to burn many before dragging his armada into the 
fray. Octavian’s ships, on the other hand, were better prepared, lighter, and more manoeuvrable 
as they lay in wait in the thick surf at the mouth of the strait. To remain trapped in the 
Ambracian Gulf was not an option; Antonius’ vast land army could hardly remain encamped 
near Actium indefinitely, and had to be ferried away to the safety of Egypt. Reluctantly, he 
gave battle.1 
 
The escape to Egypt never came. After a protracted and indecisive struggle—the one side 
weaving lightly in and out, ramming, smashing the enemy oars, and withdrawing; the other 
side raining down missiles from its high towers, closing in to board with its heavy armament 
and numerous marines—Cleopatra, looking on from the rear, gave the order to her subjects to 
withdraw in good order. Antonius’ men mistook their allies’ withdrawal for a rout, panicked, 
and did likewise. As they raised their sails and threw heavy materiel overboard for their escape, 
the forces of Octavian and Agrippa brought fire to bear and threw them into disarray. The result 
was a disaster. Watching the carnage from the dwindling security of their camp on land, 
Antonius’ diseased and demoralised army eventually surrendered or scattered into Macedonia. 
Antonius would fight on for another year, to no avail; Cleopatra had already offered Octavian 
her abdication. It was over.  
 
 I am grateful to Jesper Majbom Madsen and Andrew Scott for inviting me to contribute to this much-needed 
collection of recent work on the Roman History, and thank the editors for their corrections and (as ever) patience.  
1 For ancient accounts of the event, see Cass. Dio 50.12–34 and Plut. Ant. 61–68. Oddly, Appian did not choose 
to extend his Civil Wars to the final contest between Octavian and Antonius, ceasing his narrative with the death 
of Sextus Pompeius in 35 BCE.  
 It is fashionable nowadays to write of the Battle of Actium as a tawdry, shabby affair, nowhere 
nearly as decisive and important as it is magnified to be.2 Yet Cassius Dio, like all ancient 
historians who described the event, rightly recognised its importance in the long and bloody 
transition from free Republic to monarchical Empire. He devotes the entirety of Book 50 of his 
Roman History to it, and states at the very opening of the book that although Antonius and 
Octavian controlled the ‘Republic’, neither of them had yet turned it into a monarchy as such.3 
Ancient readers, just as the attentive reader today, would have recognised this deep breath 
before the plunge: a foreshadowing of the monarchy soon to come, of Octavian’s 
transformation into Augustus (‘The Revered One’), and a clear signal of the decisive role 
played in that process by the struggle off the shores of an insignificant little town in Acarnania.  
 
Yet to Dio, victory at Actium alone was not enough. The hero of the war against Mithridates, 
Cornelius Sulla, had defeated fellow Romans in a spectacular victory at the Colline Gate, 
literally beneath the walls of Rome itself; but he retired into obscurity and his new Republican 
constitution was wholly unpicked by populists within a decade. His reputation was soon in 
tatters.4 Julius Caesar had vanquished Pompeius Magnus at Pharsalus, triumphing as emperor 
in practice if not in name; but the Republican aristocracy could never accept a king, bedecked 
in gold and purple after the Hellenistic fashion.5 They took their revenge on the Ides of 
March—symbolically, it is said, beneath the statue of Pompeius Magnus himself.6 By the time 
of Actium and Book 50, Octavian’s path seems no different. Cassius Dio presents him as a 
scheming dynast, a vulture, capable of unspeakable acts of cruelty—such as the alleged 
massacre of Roman equestrians and senators at the siege of Perusia (Perugia, Italy)—and 
appalling heights of destructive ambition.7 What made Octavian successful where Sulla, 
 
2 So famously Syme 1939, 297; more recently Galinsky 2012, 33 and Beard 2015, 348. See Lange 2011, 2021 for 
an up-to-date re-evaluation of the strategy at Actium and the importance of the battle.  
3 Cass. Dio 50.1.1. 
4 For recent discussion of Rome after Sulla, see especially Rosenblitt 2019. For his reputation in particular, see 
Barden Dowling 2000, 2006; Eckert 2016; Urso 2016; Burden-Strevens 2019. On his reforms and their impact, 
cf. also the famous debate between Badian 1970 and Keaveney 2005.  
5 These are certainly the terms in which Dio describes Caesar’s rule; see Cass. Dio 44.4–6. On Caesar’s rule as an 
Hellenistic monarchy the classic survey of Rawson 1975 is still important.  
6 It is perhaps deliberate, and poetic, that Dio describes similarly the way in which both Caesar and Pompeius 
covered their faces at their deaths, powerless to resist: cf. 42.4.4 (καὶ ἔγνω ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἀμύνασθαί σφας οὔτε διαφυγεῖν 
δυνήσεται, συνεκαλύψατο) and 44.19.5 (ὥσθ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν μήτ᾽ εἰπεῖν μήτε πρᾶξαί τι τὸν Καίσαρα 
δυνηθῆναι, ἀλλὰ συγκαλυψάμενον σφαγῆναι πολλοῖς τραύμασι).  
7 For the alleged massacre at Perusia, see recently Lange 2020. Frustratingly, our two sources for this event 
(Cassius Dio and Appian) give completely contradictory accounts of what happened. The most detailed survey of 
the historian’s attitude to Augustus remains Manuwald 1979, but it is important to note that Dio distinguished 
Caesar, and all the rest were not, dying peacefully in his bed as the emperor Augustus almost 
half a century after the Battle at Actium?  
 
For the answer to that question, we need to look to the enormous bipartite debate (or 
controversia) between Agrippa and Maecenas in Book 52. In the intervening period, Dio 
narrates in Book 51 the final defeat and suicide of both Antonius and Cleopatra. Octavian 
subdued Egypt and returned to Rome in triumph; but having secured victory, the most pressing 
question was what now to do with it. Suetonius records that he paused at this point, and 
considered relinquishing (some of) his powers in order to restore genuine republican 
government at Rome.8 In Book 52 of his Roman History, Dio took that idea and expanded it 
into the most important extended reflection on the nature of Imperial rule ever written during 
the period now known as the Principate.  Octavian’s closest friends, his general Agrippa and 
the wealthy patron and advisor Maecenas, are summoned in private to advise him on the 
decision he must make: to restore republican government (Agrippa) or to formalise a monarchy 
as such (Maecenas). In doing so they reflect broadly not only on the reasons for the collapse of 
the Republic and the relative stability of Augustus’ rule, but also on the ideal government of 
the Empire in general.  
 
The exchange is unique in Imperial historiography. Dio certainly had no ‘source’ for the 
arguments it contains—9unlike some other of his speeches, which are in their main aspects 
historical—10and it entirely reflects his own causal interpretation of the historical process and 
his political philosophy in the round. As the longest surviving analysis in Greek of the 
constitution of the Roman Empire, the Agrippa–Maecenas debate is Dio’s response to 
Polybius’ excursus in Book 6 of his History on the constitution of the Roman Republic, and 
was possibly inspired by it as well as older debates of a similar nature earlier in the Greek 
tradition.11  Marking the end of his massive account of the Republic, it is the cornerstone of his 
 
between Octavian the corrupt dynast and Augustus the good emperor: on this point see Reinhold 1988, 13; Rich 
1989. 
8 Suet. Aug. 28.1. 
9 However, many of the more commonplace arguments on the virtues of the ideal ruler it contains were certainly 
inspired by earlier texts. See Fishwick 1990 for the analysis, with further discussion below.  
10 For a recent summary of Dio’s rhetorical source material and accompanying bibliography, see Burden-Strevens 
2020, chapter two.  
11 Especially so the famous constitutional debate on the government of the Persian Empire at Hdt. 3.80–82. It 
would be incredible to suggest that Dio had not studied Polybius’ work in his decade of reading, but he does not 
seem to have used him directly as a source; see Foulon 2016. Wrongly, the only monograph dedicated to the 
Agrippa–Maecenas debate (Espinosa Ruiz 1982) ignores these points and is not a useful starting-point for its 
study.    
historiographical project and is rightly famous among Roman historians today.12 The 
bibliography on the speeches of Book 52 is extensive. It is impossible to discuss all of it here, 
and the student of Dio will gain little from an exhaustive survey; we will chart instead the main 
lines of development.  
 
The purpose of what follows is to give both an introduction to, and new reappraisal of, the 
Agrippa–Maecenas debate according to its main functions. In the past, scholars have sought to 
explain what central purpose the controversia sought to fulfil in Dio’s Roman History: what 
one thing it ‘does’.13 This is a mistake, for its scope is as vast as the historian’s intentions in 
drafting it were varied. First, the speeches evidently reflect the contemporary political views 
of their author on his own time; that is, it serves as a response to the political instability, and 
occasional tyrannies, of the Severan Period (193–235 CE). To read the set-piece in this manner 
is the most traditional approach, but carries with it some critical baggage to be discussed below. 
Secondly, the debate articulates the historian’s own analysis of the fundamental weakness of 
Republican government, both on practical grounds and in relation to his political theory and 
philosophy. To place it at this point in the text, just after the Battle of Actium, makes 
historiographical sense: it concludes Dio’s history of the Republic with a summary of his 
interpretation for its collapse. This important aspect of the composition had been largely 
ignored until relatively recently.14 Thirdly, Agrippa and (especially) Maecenas set out the 
historian’s own explanation of the reasons for Augustus’ success and the stability of his regime: 
in other words, what course of action he must take in order to escape the bloody fate of Caesar 
and all the other would-be autocrats of the Late Republic. In short, the debate of Book 52 
condenses Cassius Dio’s entire theoretical framework for the collapse of the Republic, the 
emergence of monarchical rule, and the means by which that rule may be made durable—past, 
present, and future. Its scope is prodigious—and rightly so, for the largest and most ambitious 
history of Rome since Livy.15   
 
 
12 Reinhold 1988, 165 calls it “the only theoretical analysis of Roman government and society from the third 
century”. 
13 So the many articles and chapters which view the composition as basically a polemic of Dio’s against the Roman 
emperors of his day, e.g.: Meyer 1891; Millar 1964; and Makhlajuk & Markov 2008 among many others; and 
most recently Fomin 2015, 5, calling Book 52 “in essence a political pamphlet addressed against the ‘senatorial’ 
policy of Severus Alexander”.  
14 See for example Kemezis 2014; Burden-Strevens 2016. The study of Adler 2012 is also important, 
demonstrating the consistency of the views expressed by both Agrippa and Maecenas with the historian’s own 
overarching historical, political, and ethical opinions. 
15 Rightly emphasised as such by Kemezis 2014, 92. 
Dio’s Contemporary World 
 
It has long been recognised that much of the content of Maecenas’ speech addresses the 
Severan period—reflecting on its challenges (fiscal, political, and military), positing solutions 
to those challenges, and appealing for continuity with the Imperial regime established in part 
by Augustus. This is a trend which began even in the 19th century with Paul Meyer’s 1891 
dissertation on Maecenas’ part in the debate. Meyer viewed the composition as a political 
pamphlet written in order to indirectly criticise the last Severan emperor, Alexander (222–235 
CE), as a weak ruler who relied too much on the Senate: Dio thus emerges as an ‘anti-senatorial’ 
writer in favour of a largely symbolic role for that body. This interpretation is no longer 
fashionable and for the past half century has rarely been cited but to reject it.16 However, 
Meyer’s achievement lies in establishing the basic questions about the role of the text—as a 
political pamphlet addressed to a particular emperor, and an expression of the historian’s 
suggestions for sound government—which have continued to inform modern readings, even in 
the 21st century.17 We may still ask:  
 
Is this sort of discussion historical? What is its compositional role in the general structure of the 
Roman History? Which emperor of the Severan dynasty could be its addressee? Within those 
speeches, what is the relation between generalities, rhetorical and ideological clichés and Dio’s 
own political views? How real or utopian are the suggestions formulated by him?18 
  
These questions are justified by the range of topics Maecenas broaches. Many are practical and 
technical. Broadly, we can divide Maecenas’ oration into five parts. First the proemium or 
introduction (52.14–18) explains the difference between enlightened kingship on the one hand 
and tyranny on the other, and summarises the reasons for Rome’s civil wars and the imperative 
for Octavian to save the state. Secondly, Maecenas turns to the rights and responsibilities of 
the aristocracy, including senators, equestrians, and provincial governors (52.19–26): here he 
suggests how to ensure the loyalty of the provinces within the empire and (importantly) the 
compliance of their governors. Thirdly financial matters are discussed, including the 
administration and payment of the army, reforms to systems of taxation and the Imperial estate, 
and the proper privileges of the cities within the Empire (52.27–30). Section four addresses 
 
16 E.g. Hammond 1932; Gabba 1955; Bleicken 1962; Millar 1964; Fechner 1986; Reinhold 1988; Adler 2012.  
17 So Adler 2012, 478: “despite its age, in many ways Meyer’s 1891 dissertation, De Maecenatis oratione a Dione 
ficta, continues to set the intellectual parameters for the modern study of this debate.” 
18 Makhlajuk & Markov 2008, 48. 
legislative and judicial matters, suggesting protocols for trying the guilt of members of the 
Senate and measures to involve them in the legislative process: in short, guidance on how to 
treat the aristocracy mercifully (clementia) and with the illusion of respect proper from one 
citizen to another (civilitas). The fifth and final section deals with more moral concerns, 
including prescriptions on the emperor’s conduct toward his subordinates and guidance on how 
to cloak the real fact of his monarchy behind a civilian guise by declining ostentatious honours, 
statues, deification and so forth (52.35–40).  
 
Clearly such a comprehensive programme of reform was never intended as a purely ‘literary’ 
or ‘rhetorical’ schoolroom exercise, although such simplistic readings of the text have 
occasionally been attempted (with little lasting impact).19 Rather, the most common approach 
to the speech, described as such by Fergus Millar in his classic 1964 Study of Cassius Dio and 
followed widely since, is to treat it as “a serious, coherent, and fairly comprehensive plan for 
coping with what Dio conceived to be the evils of his time”.20  This is especially the case from 
chapter 19 onwards, where most scholars tend to see a break between the more general 
reflections of the proemium and the specific and detailed recommendations for reform which 
occupy the remainder of Maecenas’ oration.  
 
Some of the content from this point onward is indeed hortatory: it promotes to the 
contemporary reader—perhaps even to the current emperor himself—a vision of what the 
Empire should be (and, therefore, was not yet at the time of writing, early in the 3rd century 
CE). Dio’s suggestions, placed into the mouth of Maecenas, are at their most original when they 
concern financial and administrative matters. This perhaps should not surprise in view of the 
historian’s career: if we accept the later and more generally followed dating for the composition 
of Book 52 (under Severus Alexander, c. 223 CE),21 then Dio had by this time quite wide 
personal experience of provincial government, including a spell as curator (governor fiscal) of 
Pergamum and Smyrna in 217 CE.22   
 
19 Burgess 1902, 206n.2; Zawadski 1983, 283. This view is rarely endorsed in modern work, but see Fomin 2015, 
214, who treats the Agrippa–Maecenas debate as one of many examples of “the great extent of permeation of 
school rhetoric into Dio’s speeches”. Fomin does not, however, unfairly criticise the historian for this perceived 
aspect and the treatment he offers of Dio’s rhetorical art is a deal more nuanced than much earlier work. See also 
Fomin 2016.    
20 Millar 1964, 107.  
21 This later dating is followed by Bleicken 1962; Espinosa Ruiz 1982; Barnes 1984; Reinhold 1988 and most 
recent work. The much earlier dating to 214 CE proposed by Millar 1964, 104 is a lone voice. 
22 Millar 1964, 5–27 remains a solid summary of the historian’s life and career; the main details can be found at 
Cass. Dio 69.1.3, 74[73].12.2, 78[72].7.2, 80[79]5.1.  
 He proposes, for example, that the emperor sell the property of the state, including ager 
publicus (state land), and use the capital raised to give investment loans at a moderate rate of 
interest. “In this way”, he writes, “the land will be put to productive use under the new owners 
who cultivate it; they will acquire property and become more prosperous; and the treasury will 
obtain a permanent source of sufficient revenue”.23 Here Dio departs radically from 
contemporary practice; if anything the Imperial estate grew rather than shrank in the years 
following Augustus’ accession to the throne, as Hammond notes in his classic article on 
Maecenas’ speech.24 His vision for taxation is similarly innovative, even progressive: all 
property—including land—and the profits issuing from them should be valued and taxed at an 
equal proportional rate across the empire, and no individual or district should be exempted. 
Payment should be made more manageable through smaller instalments rather than a lump 
sum.25 Dio was far ahead of his time in suggesting so equitable a reform of the taxation system: 
Augustus was greeted with howls when he suggested something similar,26 and the exemption 
of land in Italy from taxation was not lifted until Diocletian’s time in the late third century.27 
Provincial matters also lead Maecenas to argue for the abolition of all systems of local weights, 
measurements, and coinage—still common in the more highly-developed Greek East in the 
Severan period—and to restrict the zealous competition between these cities for prestige by 
curtailing their games and magnificent building works.28 As the speeches of Dio of Prusa attest, 
such competition for status among the cities of the Greek East in particular could be genuinely 
divisive. Maecenas additionally recommends clearly separating the public treasury (aerarium) 
from the emperor’s personal funds (fiscus) by appointing salaried officials for each, drawn from 
the equestrian order—a clear step back from contemporary practice.29 Other important reforms, 
such as the division of the Empire and Italy itself, by race even (κατά τε γένη καὶ ἔθνη), into 
smaller territorial units with a more uniform system of administration, reflect developments 
not yet fully realised in Dio’s time.30  Evidently, the historian used his speech of Maecenas in 
Book 52 to set out concrete proposals for change in the administration of Severan Rome. 
 
23 Cass. Dio 52.28.3–4. 
24 For the discussion, see Hammond 1932, 96.  
25 Cass. Dio 52.28.6–8. 
26 Cass. Dio 56.28.4.  
27 Hammond 1932, 97.   
28 Cass. Dio 52.30.3–9.  
29 Cass. Dio 52.25.1–5. See Mommsen 1875, II.2, 1012; also Hammond 1932, 94–65. Cf. 53.22.3–4, where Dio 
states explicitly that in his own time the distinction between the aerarium and the fiscus had become hopelessly 
blurred; Maecenas’ recommendations on this point are evidently a response to that.  
30 Cass. Dio 52.22.1; cf. Mommsen 1875, II.2, 1081–1086.  
 However, the greater part of Maecenas’ programme cites reforms that Augustus or subsequent 
emperors did in fact implement in some form prior to the historian’s lifetime. It is therefore 
very difficult to see its purpose straightforwardly as an exhortation, a propaganda pamphlet 
outlining necessary reforms for the Severan age, or a polemic against that age as such.  If that 
were Dio’s intention, then necessarily his Maecenas would be arguing mainly for progress not 
already begun. He recommends, for example, that Augustus revise the membership of the 
Senate, excluding unworthy members and inviting the “best men” from the provinces to take 
their place.31 As a Greek-speaking intellectual from a distinguished family in Nicaea (İznik, 
north-western Turkey) who, like his father, rose to the ranks of the Senate and the consulship,32 
Dio here not only commends the actual practices of his own day, but perhaps also alludes to 
the revisions of the Senate membership (lectiones) conducted by Augustus himself.33 In a 
similar vein his speaker argues that citizenship should be given to all free inhabitants of the 
empire, leading to his famous statement that all the newly-enfranchised Romans shall live 
together in a single city, one polis—the Roman Empire—and make their far-flung townships 
into the outskirts of the city of Rome itself.34 This is universally recognised as referring to the 
Edict of Antoninus (Constitutio Antoniniana) issued by Caracalla in 212 CE, which had the 
effect described above. Dio in fact criticises Caracalla’s motives for issuing this edict at a later 
point in his work—he attributed it to the emperor’s desire for increased tax revenues to 
squander—,35 but this is not a criticism of the effects of the measure per se, merely its intent. 
 
So much for the provincials. As for those deputed to govern them, Maecenas’ (read: Dio’s) 
programme advertised to Octavian in the wake of the Battle of Actium again clearly reflects 
many existing practices of the Imperial period. He proposes a minimum age-requirement of 
twenty-five for any man to become a senator and thirty for the praetorship;36 this mirrors 
Augustan practice and is remarkably similar to the trajectory that Dio himself followed in the 
late 2nd century CE, probably becoming a senator in his mid-twenties and a praetor in his early 
 
31 Cass. Dio 52.19.1–3.  
32 It has long been known that Dio’s father Apronianus was a senator, governor of Dalmatia (69.1.3) as well as 
legatus in Cilicia (69.1.3, 73.7.2); it is probable that he also attained the consulship (IGRR 3.654). For a 
prosopography of father and son see PIR II, C 413 and PIR II, C 492. 
33 Suet. Aug. 35; Aug. RG. 8. For discussion and evidence see Hardy 1923, 54–60; Brunt 1984. At Cass. Dio 
52.42, immediately after the close of Maecenas speech, Augustus takes precisely the course of action 
recommended by his advisor, and again at 54.13.1.  
34 Cass. Dio 52.19.6. 
35 Cass. Dio 78.9.3–7. 
36 Cass. Dio 52.20.1–2.  
thirties.37 The candidates for these posts, Maecenas continues, should be selected by the 
emperor himself and the scope of free elections should be restricted;38 Dio’s contemporary 
readers would have recognised this also. To guard against corruption and apportion the 
requisite honour, Maecenas suggests that public officials be awarded a salary, and serve in 
provincial government for longer terms than only one year—at least three years—to gain 
experience. These changes had again become regular by the Severan period.39  Though not 
fully a province in the sense of other territories of the Roman empire, Italy too in Maecenas’ 
programme should have two praetorian prefects drawn from the equestrian class to share 
responsibility over the troops stationed there, both the Praetorian Guard and other forces; by 
the time this speech was written, this had been a regular practice for almost two hundred 
years.40  
 
Numerous other aspects of Maecenas’ oration on the government of the ideal monarchy depict 
the Principate not as it should be, but in fact had been until the time of Dio’s writing. This is 
especially the case with his recommendations for the relationship between the emperor and the 
aristocracy. The emperor should extend his patronage to the aristocratic youth, the iuventus, 
funding public education in academic as well as martial pursuits.41 Legislation should be 
enacted not through the popular assemblies of the old Republic, but through the mechanism of 
a decree of the Senate issued at the emperor’s behest.42 Embassies and appeals should in the 
first instance go to their provincial governor in the case of local aristocracies or, in the case of 
foreign dignitaries, to the Senate.43  When a member of that body is accused of misconduct or 
a crime, he should enjoy the right to be tried by his peers rather than a popular jury or the 
emperor alone.44 Moreover, though the chief executive officer of the Roman Empire, the 
monarch should nevertheless consult with suitably qualified members of the aristocracy on all 
 
37 Cassius Dio was made praetor for 194 CE by the emperor Pertinax, and the appointment was seemingly not 
reversed by his successor (74.12.2). He was probably around thirty at the time: there is little scholarly support for 
the suggestion in Carey’s 1914–1927 LCL edition that he was born in 155 CE. 
38 Cass. Dio 52.20.3. 
39 Cass. Dio 52.23.2; cf. RE XII (1924), 1144 (‘legatus’); Millar 2002, 271–291, 314–320. 
40 Cass. Dio 52.22.2; cf. Mommsen 1875, II.2, 866n.8. 
41 Cass. Dio 52.26.1–2; cf. Anderson 1993 on the publicly-funded professors of rhetoric at Rome and Athens in 
the Imperial period. 
42 Cass. Dio 52.32.1–2; cf. Hammond 1932, 98: “when he further suggests that all legislation be enacted through 
the senate, he propounds what had by the time of Hadrian become recognized legal doctrine”. 
43 Cass. Dio 52.30.9–10, 52.31.1. Dio and Tacitus give numerous examples of embassies from foreign states, such 
as client kings, to the Senate in Augustus’ time (e.g. 52.43.1, 55.33.5, 56.25.7; Ann. 2.42.5, 2.67.3), and the 
practice continued thereafter. As for the local aristocracies, the practice of appeals to the provincial governor in 
the first instance is well known: see Millar 1977 and, importantly Plin. Epist. 10.23, 10.31, 10.43–44, 10.47, 10.56, 
10.58–60 among many others.  
44 Cass. Dio 52.32.2–3; cf. Mommsen 1875, II.2, 960–962. 
important legislative, military, or political matters, including the appointment of officials: he 
should in order words establish a council (consilium).45 Finally—and perhaps most importantly 
of all, as we shall later see—Maecenas recommends that the emperor take scrupulous care over 
the outward manifestation of his power, especially before the aristocracy. He should decline 
all exceptional and magnificent honours, whether awarded by the Senate or any other body, 
and refuse statues wrought in precious metals and temples erected solely in his honour; these 
give only the illusion of power, and make the princeps appear more like a despot, envied and 
hated, than a mild and respectful citizen.46 And a citizen indeed:  in closing, Maecenas notes 
that if the emperor needs an official title, he may be styled imperator or Caesar—that is, 
civilian titles—and never ‘king’.47  
 
All of the above recommendations are recognisable aspects of the political culture of the 
Principate. Some are detailed and technical, minute even, and provide a summary of reforms 
adopted by Augustus or his successors which were still extant in Dio’s time.48 Others—
especially those concerning the emperor’s conduct vis-à-vis the Senate and the appearance of 
his power—encapsulate by-then established aristocratic attitudes toward imperial rule, 
emphasising the importance of civilitas: the belief that the emperor ought to behave humbly 
toward the Senate, affording them the respect they were due.49 The speech of Maecenas 
therefore cannot be simply a propaganda piece, calling for change in the Severan period. A 
better way of looking at it, perhaps, is as an overview of the development of Imperial rule.50 
Situated at this transitional point between Republic and Empire in his Roman History, Dio took 
this opportunity to survey for the benefit of his reader those wide-reaching changes—political, 
institutional, military, economic—that would arise in the two hundred years between 
Augustus’ accession to the throne and his own entry into public life as a senator in the early 
180s CE. Many were instituted by Augustus himself and were observed to varying degrees 
 
45 Cass. Dio 52.15.1–2; cf. Mommsen 1875, II.2, 988–992; Brunt 1984. A senatorial consilium was certainly in 
effect throughout the reign of Augustus and much of that of Tiberius, and was re-established by Severus 
Alexander. 
46 Cass. Dio 52.35–36. Cf. the classic discussion of Wallace-Hadrill 1982 on the importance of this point to the 
ideology of the Principate; further in Fishwick 1990 and Winterling 2009.  
47 Cass. Dio 52.40. 
48 Cass. Dio 52.41.1–2: “[Octavian] did not, however, immediately put into effect all [Maecenas’] suggestions, 
fearing to meet with failure at some point if he purposed to change the ways of all mankind at a stroke; but he 
introduced some reforms at that moment and some at a later time, leaving still others for those to effect who should 
subsequently hold the Principate, in the belief that as time passed a better opportunity would be found to put these 
latter into operation”. 
49 See again Wallace-Hadrill 1982.  
50 This is the principal suggestion of Hammond 1932, and still important.  
throughout the Principate; other reforms would be left to his successors. Indeed, some of the 
more technical aspects of Dio’s programme in Book 52—such as the reorganisation of the tax 
system and removal of exemptions for Italian land, the alignment of weights, measures and 
coinages, and the division of the empire into smaller territorial units—anticipate changes that 
would only materialise after the Severan period. 
 
Dio does, however, use his Maecenas to labour one especially important point, already 
mentioned here and to him most pressing from his own experiences at the Imperial Court: the 
personal conduct of the emperor, including his moral character and his respectful treatment of 
the senatorial aristocracy. We have already seen the importance of civilitas above: it was 
embedded in the ideology of the Principate. On this particular issue our historian certainly was 
reacting, urgently and sometimes polemically, against the developments of his day. When 
reading the so-called ‘contemporary history’ or Zeitgeschichte—Books 73–80, narrating the 
events of Dio’s own lifetime—it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the historian was 
deeply concerned about the character of Imperial rule under the Severans.51 In a famous and 
often-cited passage, he notes that with the death of Marcus Aurelius—the last of the string of 
second-century emperors whom the Roman historiographical tradition deemed to be just and 
competent—, Rome degenerated from an age of gold to an empire of iron and rust.52 Maecenas’ 
part in the debate of Book 52 thus gave Dio an opportunity to reflect, right at the beginning of 
his Imperial narrative, on the qualities he considered desirable in the ideal emperor. There can 
be no doubt that he believed that the emperors of his lifetime—Commodus, Septimius Severus, 
Caracalla, the short-lived pretenders of 193 and 217 CE, Elagabalus, and Severus Alexander—
failed to live up to these standards. This is certainly the strongest argument for supporting the 
speculation offered by Millar—and speculation it is—that Dio may have personally declaimed 
the speech he wrote for Maecenas at the Imperial Court, perhaps before the emperor himself.53  
 
Setting out his paradigm for the ideal ruler in this way enabled Dio to engage with, and 
contribute to, the rich tradition of ‘kingship literature’.54 The roots of this tradition were 
ancient: in the Greek world we think of Greek texts such as Xenophon’s The Education of 
 
51 See most recently Madsen 2020 for discussion of Dio’s response to the emperors of his own time, and Kemezis 
2014 for an excellent analysis of the historian’s desire to locate continuity between the ‘good emperors’ of old 
and those of his own day. Bering-Staschewski 1981 provides a study of the Zeitgeschichte more generally. 
52 Cass. Dio 72[71].36.4. 
53 Millar 1964, 104.  
54 For summaries of the Agrippa-Maecenas debate in the light of kingship literature and within the tradition of the 
speculum principis, see especially: Dorandi 1985; Fishwick 1990.  
Cyrus, or the advice offered to King Croesus of Lydia by the Athenian sage, Solon, in Book 1 
of Herodotus’ Histories. We might also compare the Agrippa-Maecenas debate, comparing the 
merits of ‘democracy’ (the Republic) with those of monarchy, to Herodotus’ famous tripartite 
debate on the best constitution for the Persian Empire in Book 3. With the return of monarchical 
rule to Rome after hiatus of half a millennium—and when that process of cultural absorption 
and adaptation of Greek ideas known to scholars as ‘Hellenisation’ had reached its zenith—
this genre acquired renewed vigour in the Roman tradition not only as a literary exercise, but 
also as a means of guiding the emperor and exhorting him toward the just or generous course 
of action. Flattery, too, was a welcome corollary of such an exercise.  
 
Dio’s oration of Maecenas in Book 52 is evidently his attempt to show his awareness of this 
tradition and it has long been known that many of its arguments draw from commonplaces in 
contemporary political thought. One function of Maecenas is thus a speculum principis, 
holding a ‘mirror’ to the emperor’s conduct. Whether it is Commodus, Caracalla, or Severus 
Alexander being addressed here is not quite the point. The speech surveys commonly-
recognised criteria for the ‘good emperor’—which Dio himself certainly endorsed—and invites 
the reader (or listener, if the speech was indeed declaimed) to evaluate his emperor in relation 
to those criteria. Some are mentioned not only here, but even recur quite explicitly later in the 
Roman History.  
 
First, Maecenas recommends that Augustus should never permit statues of himself in gold and 
silver to be erected; these are wasteful, ephemeral, and all too easy for one’s enemies to melt 
down.55 The basic idea can be found in Pliny’s Panegyric for Trajan or Plutarch’s Moral 
Essays,56 but in Dio’s work the idea frequently returns, and he invites us in each case to reflect 
on the ideal emperor. He lists the prodigious honours awarded to Commodus, including a gold 
statue weighing a thousand pounds, and vast numbers of statues elsewhere depicting him as 
Hercules.57 Fittingly, he was strangled in the bath by an athlete. Dio notes with some ironic 
glee that, being unable to tear Commodus’ corpse limb from limb, people at least did so with 
his statues.58 Those that remained were melted down and the materials sold by his short-lived 
successor Pertinax,59 the first pretender of 193 CE elected by the Praetorian Guard.  When 
 
55 Cass. Dio 52.35.3–5.  
56 Plut. Mor. 360c; 820f; Plin. Pan. 52.3–5. See Fishwick 1990 for an excellent discussion of this point.  
57 Cass. Dio 73[72].15. 
58 Cass. Dio 74.2. 
59 Cass. Dio 74.5. 
Pertinax—of whom Dio generally approved—was assassinated by his erstwhile electors only 
a few months later, Didius Julianus bought their loyalty for a short time and rose to the throne 
in his place. Dio thought him a tyrant and a usurper who commanded little respect in the Senate, 
and he records almost poetically the fate of his statues, too: 
 
When the Senate voted to him a statue wrought in gold, he did not accept it, saying instead: “give 
me a bronze statue so that it may last; for it seems to me that all the gold and silver statues of previous 
emperors have been torn down, whereas the bronze ones remain”. In saying this he was wrong, for 
it is virtue that preserves the memory of rulers. Besides, the bronze statue we granted to him was 
toppled along with him.60 
 
ψηφισαμένης δὲ τῆς βουλῆς χρυσοῦν ἀνδριάντα αὐτοῦ οὐ προσεδέξατο, εἰπὼν ὅτι ‘χαλκοῦν μοι 
δότε, ἵνα καὶ μείνῃ· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρὸ ἐμοῦ αὐτοκρατόρων τοὺς μὲν χρυσοῦς καὶ ἀργυροῦς ὁρῶ 
καθαιρεθέντας, τοὺς δὲ χαλκοῦς μένοντας,’ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο εἰπών· ἀρετὴ γὰρ ἡ διαφυλάττουσα 
τὴν μνήμην τῶν κρατούντων· ὁ γὰρ δοθεὶς αὐτῷ χαλκοῦς ἀναιρεθέντος αὐτοῦ καθῃρέθη. 
 
This is Dio at his most catty, and the reader has seen this idea before. In Book 52, Maecenas 
advises Augustus that immortality is obtained not by a vote, but by virtue alone: if he rules 
just and honourably then that will be enough, “and the whole earth will be your sacred 
precinct, all cities your temples, and all men your statues, since you will forever be enshrined 
and glorified within their thoughts”.61 He labours the point because he wishes us to remember 
Maecenas’ advice, and to apply it to the emperors of his own time. Statues and other 
vainglorious honours make the emperor no more competent or deserving; those distinctions 
are achieved by humility and virtue alone. 
 
From this point onward, statues of precious metal remain a shorthand or topos for incompetent 
and tyrannical figures, always ending in their destruction. Septimius Severus’ cousin and 
prefect of the Praetorian Guard, Plautianus, “had statues and images not only far more 
numerous but even larger than those of emperors themselves”;62 when Severus gave the order 
that many of the more excessive ones in the city be destroyed, many assumed that Plautianus 
had fallen from favour and began tearing them down elsewhere.63 Severus had him executed 
in 205 CE, and Dio notes again, with poetic irony, that the remainder of his statues were 
 
60 Cass. Dio 74.14.2. 
61 Cass. Dio 52.35.5; cf. Thuc. 2.43.3; Tac. Ann. 4.3 
62 Cass. Dio 76[75].14.6–7.  
63 Cass. Dio 76[75].16.2.  
destroyed.64 As for the emperor’s son and heir Caracalla, he nurtured such a hatred for his 
brother Geta that after having him killed, he vented his anger by pelting stones even at the 
empty bases where his statues once stood;65 when Caracalla himself was assassinated in 217 
CE, Dio records that the people melted down his gold and silver statues with fervent 
rejoicing.66 Maecenas’ guidance to Augustus on the impermanence of grand monuments to 
the emperor is therefore not mere commonplace, but rather a quite central aspect of Dio’s 
political philosophy and key to his conception of the ideal emperor.  
 
Secondly, the same principle applies to prodigious and extraordinary honours in general, which 
Maecenas advises Augustus to decline. The good emperor should allow no exceptional 
distinction to be given to him, even when voted by the Senate; for since he is already supremely 
powerful, nothing can be awarded him greater than what he possesses already, and in fact his 
position is weakened by such flatteries.67  The idea again tallies with similar arguments in 
Plutarch and Pliny,68 but it is a mistake to treat Maecenas’ words simply as ‘copying’. The need 
for the monarch to demonstrate his civilitas, to behave with humility and respect and even play 
the part of an equal before the aristocracy, was in Dio’s view of profound importance for the 
stability of Imperial rule and therefore the stability of the Empire as a whole. By Book 52, the 
reader has already seen the catastrophic results that may issue from a monarch who forgets 
these prescriptions, gets carried away by flattery and loses (literally) his head.  It is Dio’s basic 
explanation for the murder of Julius Caesar: the Senate voted him ever-more ostentatious 
honours, including a golden throne set with jewels and the right to wear purple, because they 
wished to make him envied and hated as a tyrant and so justify his murder.69 On the Ides of 
March they got their wish.  
 
Later emperors who fail to follow Maecenas’ (that is, Dio’s) advice usually obtain a similar 
fate. Marcus Aurelius serves as a counter-example: in Dio’s view he not only survived as 
emperor but even preserved the Empire in the process, ruling better than any other who had 
held the position. In spite of his status as the adopted son of Hadrian, he remained humble and 
even dressed as a private citizen.  When his wars in Pannonia threatened the treasury, he sold 
 
64 Cass. Dio 76[75].16.4. 
65 Cass. Dio 78.12.6.  
66 Cass. Dio 79.18. 
67 Cass. Dio 52.35.1–2.  
68 Plut. Mor. 543d, 820f, Demetrius 10.2, 30.6–8; Plin. Pan. 55.1. 
69 Cass. Dio 44.3–8.  
off Imperial property rather than exacting harsh taxes on the aristocracy beneath him. Though 
a Caesar, even when young he saluted the foremost aristocrats with esteem, and proceeded into 
the Senate as if he were a member of the equestrian order rather than the man ordained to be 
their king.70  
 
What a contrast his humility and respect present with those who followed in Dio’s own time! 
Commodus assumed extraordinary titles: ‘conqueror of the earth’, the ‘Roman Hercules’, and 
so forth.71 When fighting in the arena, he would command the senators looking on at the 
spectacle—Dio included—to call out praise, lauding him as master of the earth, most blessed 
and triumphant of all men.72 Later, Caracalla demanded golden crowns from the cities of the 
Empire, and vainglorious building projects: fine houses and lodgings for him to rest even on 
short journeys, paid for entirely at the expense of the aristocracy, “in which he not only never 
lived but in some cases never even saw”.73 The chatty anecdotes told by the historian give a 
surprisingly personal and unique taste of life under Caracalla, an emperor he deemed to be 
arrogant, avaricious, and disrespectful. He would summon Dio and other senior members of 
the Senate (his comites) to hold court or transact some business shortly after dawn, and upon 
their arrival left them waiting outside. On these occasions even his reception-rooms were shut: 
Dio and his colleagues were made to stand around waiting, often until noon and sometimes 
until the evening.74 As for Elagabalus (r. 218–222 CE), the Roman History records that he 
assumed all the official powers and honorific titles of a Roman emperor “without even waiting 
for us to award them, as would have been proper” (οὐκ ἀναμένων τι, ὡς εἰκὸς ἦν, παρ᾽ ἡμῶν 
ψήφισμα).75 In this context, it is easy to see Maecenas’ appeal for the new emperor Augustus 
to be humble, rejecting ostentation and vain honours, as the historian’s genuine polemic against 
the trends of his day, and an appeal to pay the senatorial aristocracy the respect he deemed 
them due.   
 
Third and finally, the theme of mercy is of obvious importance. As a Roman senator who lived 
in an age of civil wars and repeated usurpers and pretenders, Dio had a vested interest in the 
emperor’s treatment of those unfortunate enough to find themselves on the wrong side. As 
 
70 Cass. Dio 72[71].35. 
71 Cass. Dio 73[72].15.2–6.  
72 Cass. Dio 73[72].20. 
73 Cass. Dio 78.9.4. 
74 Cass. Dio 78.17.3–4.  
75 Cass. Dio 79.16. 
Carsten Lange has recently written, we must not underestimate the horror of civil war and its 
centrality to Dio’s history:76 many of his colleagues and acquaintances in the Senate were put 
to death, and Dio tells us himself that he had reason to be concerned for his safety when Didius 
Julianus briefly usurped the throne.77 His Roman History expands widely on the theme of 
Imperial clemency, often through speeches: the longest is the dialogue between Augustus and 
his wife Livia in Book 55 of his Roman History, where she advises him to show mercy to a 
conspirator against his life.78 At a later point in the contemporary history Dio also inserts a 
short speech given by the aptly-named Cassius Clemens, encouraging the new emperor 
Septimius Severus to give his clemency (clementia) to members of the elite who had no choice 
but to side with his enemies.79 The former is almost certainly the historian’s invention,80 but he 
may have been present to hear the latter.   
 
Understandably therefore, Dio reserves a substantial portion of his speech of Maecenas to the 
importance of mercy, calm, forgiveness, and kindness in an emperor (52.31.5–52.34.11). His 
advice on this point is wide-ranging. If one is accused of plotting against the regime, the 
emperor should refrain from prejudging the charge or giving judgment himself. The accused 
should make his defence in the Senate, and if found guilty the emperor should moderate the 
sentence as far as possible and safe.81 When advising the monarch, senators should feel no 
reason to fear speaking their minds openly.82 The good emperor acts on genuine cases reported 
to him in the public interest, but ignores speculation or scurrilous rumours about the private 
lives of his subjects. In any case, there is no need to punish every wrong-doing: the emperor 
should apply the law judiciously, for it cannot conquer human nature, and to allow a man to 
reform himself with the promise of survival is better than to leave him with nothing to lose in 
rebelling. 83 In short, “you can best induce men to shun their wicked ways by being kind, and 
to desire better ways by being generous”.84  
 
 
76 Lange 2021; see also importantly Eckert 2014, who analyses the proscriptions of the Sullan Civil War and their 
aftermath from the innovative perspective of cultural trauma.  
77 Cass. Dio 74.12.  
78 Cass. Dio 55.14–21. The most important modern study of the speech of Livia on clemency is given by Adler 
2011; see also Giua 1981. 
79 Cass. Dio 75[74].9.  
80 Perhaps inspired by a tradition of individuals appealing to Livia to intercede with Augustus for mercy on their 
behalf in Ovid Pont. 2.7.9 and Suet. Aug. 65.2, as Barden Dowling 2006 notes.  
81 Cass. Dio 52.31.9.  
82 Cass. Dio 52.33.6–7.  
83 Cass. Dio 52.34.4–7. 
84 Cass. Dio 52.34.9. 
Dio was not naïve: the rationale Maecenas gives for the system outlined above is not utopian, 
but rather pragmatic. Yet in any case, it would be an understatement to say that the reigns of 
the Severan emperors described by him do not approach even this standard in Books 73–80 of 
the Roman History. Septimius Severus made many noble promises to put no senator to death 
and issued a decree to that effect, but almost immediately executed the very senator who 
assisted him in drawing up that decree, and many others besides.85 The list of those executed 
by Commodus in the text, including ex-consuls and women, would be tedious to number over:86 
they included the two Quintilii brothers, distinguished members of the Senate whose fine villa 
still stands outside Rome today and was confiscated by the emperor. The version of Caracalla’s 
reign presented in the Roman History is similarly brutal; the list of those executed was 
apparently so long that the Byzantine scholar who copied Dio’s text for us apologises for 
leaving it out, and merely summarises that Caracalla killed many of Rome’s most distinguished 
families without any justification.87 Short-lived usurpers such as Didius Julianus similarly 
hunted down those who had opposed their rise to power or supported the previous regime, and 
our historian records that Septimius Severus did the same.88 Only the first of Commodus’ 
temporary successors, Pertinax, stands out as a merciful figure. Dio writes that the Praetorian 
Guard were on the verge of deposing him and electing the consul Quintus Pompeius Sosius 
Falco in his place, but Pertinax refused to have Falco executed. He even went so far as to 
proclaim “heaven forbid that any senator should be put to death while I am ruler, even for just 
cause”. Just as Dio’s Maecenas states, Falco retired to the country, mollified by mercy, and 
caused no further trouble.89  
 
Maecenas’ speech in Book 52 thus presented the historian with an ideal opportunity to set out 
his vision of the ideal emperor, and it establishes the benchmark against which he will judge 
all monarchs from Augustus onward. To Dio, the successful emperor must shun ostentation 
and avoid conspicuous and near-divine honours. Comporting himself as if he were a member 
of the aristocracy, he must treat the Senate with the due respect, valuing their advice and 
preserving their symbolic position within the state. He must also realise both the moral and 
strategic value of mercy: this was the best way to heal the wounds of civil war and secure the 
 
85 Cass. Dio 75[74].2.1–2. See Urso 2016 for good discussion of the alleged speech made by this emperor in praise 
of the cruelty of Marius and Sulla.  
86 E.g. Cass. Dio 73[72].4–5. 
87 Cass. Dio 78.6.1.  
88 Cass. Dio 74.16.5, 75[74].1.1. 
89 Cass. Dio 74.8. 
emperor from envy and plotting. In short, he must be the civilis princeps, the citizen-king. In 
these respects, the historian evidently did intend to use his Maecenas as a means of responding 
to the ills of his time: it is almost a manifesto for the ideal emperor he felt Rome needed, a 
Marcus Aurelius or a Pertinax instead of the string of tyrants that followed. It is less a 
programme of reform as such, since most of Maecenas’ detailed recommendations for the 
administration of the Empire were implemented by Augustus or his successors; yet in view of 
the crises and instability of the Severan period, it certainly appeals for continuity with that 
regime. Its fundamental intent is conservative rather than the opposite. It gives an important 
overview of the development of Imperial rule and the wide scope of the changes implemented 
in all areas of public life since the days of the Republic.  
  
Two questions remain unanswered. The first is the role played by Agrippa in the debate; to this 
point we have discussed only Maecenas. Agrippa has little to say to Dio’s contemporary reader: 
unlike his counterpart, he is necessarily silent on how the Empire (and therefore Dio’s 
contemporary world) should be managed, and he restricts his comments to the virtues of 
republicanism as compared with the vices of tyranny. But this by no means suggests that 
Agrippa’s speech served no purpose, and this raises our second question: Dio’s rationale for 
including the debate at this specific point in his Roman History. It has been a common scholarly 
habit to read the Agrippa–Maecenas debate as a standalone composition, that is as a political 
pamphlet for the Severan age. Yet if this were truly the historian’s intention, there would be no 
need to include Agrippa at all, nor to incorporate this material into his historical narrative of 
the decline of the Republic and the emergence of Augustus’ regime. Let us now fit these pieces 
together, and read the Agrippa–Maecenas debate as part of Dio’s story-arc.   
 
Between Republic and Empire 
  
Agrippa’s speech is noticeably shorter than that of Maecenas. As with Maecenas, it is possible 
to divide his oration into some relatively straightforward sections. He compares ‘democracy’ 
with ‘tyranny’ through a set of political criteria: the role of civic virtue in such systems (52.2–
5); the use and procuration of state finances (52.6); how justice is administered (52.7); how 
competition operates among their respective aristocracies (52.8–9); the effects of real power 
upon the individual in both systems (52.10); the distribution of favours and honours (52.11–
12); and finally, a list of examples from Republican Roman history of great statesmen who 
conceived of  desire for monarchical rule and fell from grace as a result (52.13). Agrippa’s 
peroratio (conclusion) has not survived as there is a missing folio in our manuscript. But by 
chapter 13, he is clearly winding up, and his arguments will not have proceeded much further.   
 
At first glance its purpose is very simple: it seeks to persuade the young Octavian, recently 
victorious at the Battle of Actium, to restore the Republic and lay down the extraordinarily 
wide-ranging powers he has hitherto enjoyed as a triumvir. Unlike Maecenas’ response to 
follow, however, Agrippa’s main argument is achieved not through detailed and specific 
suggestions, but rather through a generalising comparison of the virtues of ‘democracy’ or 
δημοκρατία—the word used by Dio and other Greek historians to describe the Roman 
Republic—90with the vices of ‘tyranny’ (τυραννίς), that is, monarchy in its degenerate or 
corrupted form.  
 
This immediately should give us pause: Agrippa is not comparing like with like. In ancient 
Greek political thought, there existed three basic forms of government: rule by the people, rule 
by the elite, and rule by a single monarch. As famously explored by Polybius in Book 6 of his 
Histories, for each form of government there was a positive and negative nuance.91 Rule by the 
elite, for example, may in its best form be described as an ‘aristocracy’, or rule by the ‘best 
men’ (ἄριστοι); but excessive corruption or abuse of power may degrade the system into an 
‘oligarchy’, that is, absolute rule by a narrow cabal of the few. Similarly, democracy (literally 
rule by the people or demos) has a positive connotation, but its negative opposite—ochlocracy 
or ‘rule by the mob’—denotes a crazed mass whose worst instincts are pandered to by 
demagogues and populists. Rule by a single individual, on the other hand, may be described as 
‘monarchy’ or even better ‘kingship’ (βασιλεία) where the monarch exercises his power fairly 
and legitimately; but rule by a usurper, or a violent and cruel individual, is not kingship but 
rather ‘tyranny’ (τυραννίς).92 Dio’s educated readers would have noticed immediately the 
logical fallacy of Agrippa’s argument: he compares rule by the people in its positive form, 
democracy, with monarchy in its worst form, tyranny.  
 
 
90 On Dio’s Greek vocabulary for Roman institutions, see Freyburger-Galland 1997 and Burden-Strevens 2016. 
Markov 2014 provides a recent study of the meaning of δημοκρατία in the Roman History; for Dio’s view of the 
Roman δημοκρατία in general (especially in the speeches), see Fechner 1986 and Burden-Strevens 2020. As 
Coudry 2016b has shown his lexical choices are, moreover, often meaningful and deliberate.  
91 Polyb. 6.2–18. 
92 For good surveys of the place and definition of tyranny in ancient (especially Greek) political thought, see 
McGlew 1993 and Lewis 2006. Béranger 1935, though old, is also still useful.   
The reason for this fallacy is simple, and it is deliberate on Dio’s part. As a Republican 
statesman,93 Agrippa cannot conceive of monarchy in anything but a negative form. Dio’s other 
staunch Republican politicians, such as Catulus in his speech of Book 36 and Cicero in Book 
44, never describe monarchy in positive terms: it is always a tyranny. In describing monarchy 
in a similarly categorical way, Agrippa displays Dio’s awareness of the political attitudes of 
the Republican aristocracy. In Latin, ‘monarchy’ (regnum) and ‘king’ (rex) were rarely positive 
terms, and usually had a pejorative application.94 Monarchy was anathema to the proud 
Republican statesman, raised on tales of the expulsion of the ancient Tarquin kings from Rome 
and the foundation of the res publica. Dio has his Agrippa speak in an entirely appropriate 
manner for the speaker and the context. Unlike Maecenas, he cannot imagine or describe sole 
rule in anything but tyrannical terms.   
 
Yet this also sets up an implicit hurdle for Octavian to surmount in the aftermath of Actium, 
and this hurdle is of genuine historical importance. A monarch at Rome, Agrippa shows us, 
could never be considered anything but a tyrant. Agrippa states this problem at the beginning 
of his speech: should Octavian choose monarchy, he states, then people will think that he has 
been aiming at it all the while, merely using revenge for his murdered father Caesar as a 
specious excuse to enslave Rome rather than freeing it. People will think him crafty, crooked, 
malicious, depraved—all attributes of the tyrant.  The result, he predicts, will be a repetition of 
past events: disgrace (Sulla) or even death (Marius, Pompeius, Caesar).95 Were the point not 
sufficiently clear, these exempla return at the end of his speech. “You remember”, Agrippa 
whispers paraliptically, “how people proceeded against your father just because they became 
suspicious that he wished to make himself sole ruler”.96 Agrippa thus raises a fundamental 
historical question for Dio’s narrative of the transition from Republic to Principate. How could 
Octavian make himself a monarch without suffering the same fate as those before him? Was it 
possible to rule Rome justly and without a tyrannical reputation? 
 
93 Or at least, in his dramatic presentation as a Republican statesman in this particular speech for Dio’s purposes. 
The historian later writes that Agrippa co-operated with the monarchical regime despite having advised against it 
(52.41.2), and did so as enthusiastically as if he had himself been in favour of Empire from the outset (54.29.3: 
ὡς καὶ δυναστείας ὄντως ἐπιθυμητὴς). Millar 1964, 105–106 argues that the historian therefore made a poor choice 
in attributing Republican sentiments to Agrippa in Book 52, since he was a monarchist. However, that is a 
misunderstanding of the Greek of these passages: in both 52.41.2 and 54.29.3, Dio clearly states that Agrippa was 
opposed to the foundation of a monarchy but co-operated with it out of loyalty to Augustus and as if (ὡς καὶ) he 
had recommended it himself.    
94 Dunkle 1967.  
95 Cass. Dio 52.2.4–7, 52.13.2, 52.15.3–4.  
96 Cass. Dio 52.13.4.  
 As well as explaining the risk to Octavian’s reputation, Dio additionally uses his Agrippa to 
summarise more practical and immediate dangers that may arise should he choose to make 
himself monarch. Most important is the threat posed to Octavian’s regime and even his life 
itself by ambitious provincial commanders eager to supplant him. In the section of his oration 
devoted to comparing aristocratic competition in monarchies and democracies, Agrippa 
summarises the likely difficulties Octavian’s monarchy will face as follows:    
 
It will be absolutely necessary for you to have many assistants in governing so vast an inhabited 
world, and I suspect that all of them will need to be of a brave and noble disposition. But if you 
entrust both legions and provinces to men such as these, you and your government will be in danger 
of being overthrown.97 
 
νῦν δὲ πᾶσά σε ἀνάγκη συναγωνιστὰς πολλούς, ἅτε τοσαύτης οἰκουμένης ἄρχοντα, ἔχειν, καὶ 
προσήκει που πάντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους εἶναι. οὐκοῦν ἂν μὲν τοιούτοις τισὶ τά 
τε στρατεύματα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζῃς, κίνδυνος ἔσται καὶ σοὶ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ καταλυθῆναι. 
 
The reader of Dio’s narrative to this point cannot doubt the reality of this risk. By Book 52, we 
have seen countless examples of generals and governors out on the periphery, challenging the 
central authority with military force. Octavian himself of course, whose power began more or 
less with a private army raised at his own expense; Marius, who catapulted himself to 
extraordinary power after his wars against the Cimbri; Sulla, who marched on Rome itself at 
the head of an army of veterans, loyal to him from their service against Mithridates in Asia; 
and naturally Caesar, who followed Sulla’s example.  
 
Thus, at this critical point of transition in Dio’s narrative of the decline of the Republic and the 
emergence of the Principate, Agrippa serves to articulate some key historical problems that 
Octavian would—did—have to address in solidifying his nascent rule, including the risk to his 
reputation as a tyrant rather than a benevolent ruler and the danger of other ambitious usurpers 
seeking to follow his example. It is important to note that this is the first point in the Roman 
History at which the historian raises these important questions, and it is a fictitious speech, not 
the narrative, which takes on the explanatory burden. In the recent words of Valérie Fromentin, 
speeches are often the key to Dio’s interpretation of historical events,98 and recent years have 
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witnessed a growth in scholarly attention to Dio’s use of speeches as a means of explaining the 
causes of events and of exploring his major interpretative premises and themes.99  
 
However, the attentive reader will have noticed already another obvious logical flaw in 
Agrippa’s argument, and this again is deliberate on the historian’s part. His arguments against 
monarchy focus on the potential risk of ambitious provincial commanders challenging the 
central government, and on Octavian’s reputation as a usurper or tyrant. These were real 
challenges to his position indeed; but they were not new. Agrippa describes these dangers as 
particular to monarchy, but the reader knows otherwise and has seen these faults many times 
already in Dio’s history of the Late Republic. There had, indeed, been many tyrants and 
usurpers already under the so-called Republic of the first century BCE.100 Agrippa’s peculiar 
praise of ‘democracy’ thus draws the reader into a personal reflection on the nature of 
Republican government as we have seen it in the preceding narrative. We refute the case he 
makes in favour of the res publica, point-by-point in real time, and we construct that refutation 
ourselves on the basis of what we have read already. The purpose of this exercise—which 
demonstrates the great extent of Dio’s compositional art—is to guide the reader to the 
conclusion that the Republican constitution could not be rescued. It was untenable, and only a 
monarchy established according to the principles outlined by Maecenas above could save 
Rome from itself.  
 
This is in fact a common tactic in Agrippa’s speech, and it must have been deliberate on the 
historian’s part: his praise of the Republic is refuted in advance through the unfolding of Dio’s 
Republican narrative. He claims, for example, that under a δημοκρατία all men are satisfied 
with the honours conferred upon them, and readily accept the punishments for their crimes. As 
so often in the Roman History, Dio’s speaker bases this argument upon human nature: all men 
in a δημοκρατία consent to be ruled by others because they seek to rule themselves, and because 
they dislike being surpassed by the successes of others, so they do not seek to outdo their peers 
with their achievements.101 Here Agrippa waxes utopian: 
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If they live under this kind of government and consider good fortunes and their opposite as belonging 
to all alike, then they do not wish any harm to come to any of the citizens, but rather pray that 
everything good may come to all people. And if one of the citizens shows particular virtue, then he 
readily shows it, practices it enthusiastically, and exhibits it most joyfully; and if he sees that virtue 
in someone else, then he readily advertises it, eagerly tries to increase it, and confers brilliant honours 
upon it. On the other hand, if one of the citizens shows himself to be wicked, then everyone hates 
him, and if unfortunate, then everyone pities him. Each citizen considers the punishment and 
disgrace that issue from these faults as shared by the whole state.102  
 
κἂν οὕτω πολιτεύωνται, κοινὰ μὲν τὰ ἀγαθὰ κοινὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία νομίζοντες εἶναι, οὔτε τι κακὸν 
οὐδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν γίγνεσθαι βούλονται, καὶ πάντα τὰ κρείττω πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς συνεύχονται. καὶ ἄν 
τε τις αὐτὸς ἀρετήν τινα ἔχῃ, καὶ προφαίνει αὐτὴν προχείρως καὶ ἀσκεῖ προθύμως καὶ ἐπιδείκνυσιν 
ἀσμενέστατα, ἄν τε καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἴδῃ, καὶ προάγει ἑτοίμως καὶ συναύξει σπουδαίως καὶ τιμᾷ 
λαμπρότατα. καὶ μέντοι κἂν κακύνηταί τις, πᾶς αὐτὸν μισεῖ, κἂν δυστυχῇ, πᾶς ἐλεεῖ, κοινὴν τῆς 
πόλεως καὶ τὴν ζημίαν καὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην τὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν εἶναι νομίζων. 
 
Agrippa rounds off the thought by comparing this with tyrannies. Under tyrannies, he claims, 
the situation is precisely the opposite. The aristocracy vie jealously for status and prestige, and 
in their fierce competition they seek to overreach one another with the minimum personal risk. 
They are so selfish that they regard the successes of others as their own loss, and their failures 
as their own gain.103  
 
Any student familiar with Dio’s narrative will know that the democratic nirvana described by 
Agrippa has nothing to do with the Late Republic. Conversely, his description of the selfish 
wickedness of the aristocracy under a ‘tyranny’ matches Dio’s presentation of Late Republican 
politics very closely. He claims that under a δημοκρατία, aristocrats do not seek to surpass their 
peers; what then do we make of Pompeius and Caesar, “the former wishing to be second to no 
man, and the latter to be first of all”?104 A recurring feature of Dio’s Republican books is the 
inability of almost all politicians to be satisfied with their lot, and the historian explains their 
fall in consequence of their selfish desire ever to acquire more.105 Thus it can hardly be said 
that all citizens in a δημοκρατία are modest and satisfied with the honours already conferred 
upon them! Furthermore, Agrippa presents democracy as a virtuous form of government in 
which the good are proudly promoted and the wicked have little influence. The historian’s 
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actual presentation of the Late Republic is precisely the opposite. Consider, for example, the 
futility of Catulus’ and Cato’s efforts to stabilise the tottering res publica with the 
untrammelled success of ambitious dynasts such as Gabinius, Clodius, Caesar, Pompeius, and 
all the rest.106 Ironically, the ‘tyranny’ described by Agrippa is in fact the Late Republic.  
 
There are many more examples of this technique, and it would serve little purpose to recite 
them all. Throughout Agrippa’s praise of δημοκρατία, Dio consciously and deliberately made 
his speaker present the Republic in terms his reader would know to be untrue, and ironically 
describe as faults of monarchy those vices which are in fact pervasive in the Late Republican 
portions of the Roman History. He states that for Octavian to make himself a monarch would 
be an act of subjection, reducing the Roman people and their allies and subject nations to 
slavery.107 But enslavement is in fact the metaphor Dio uses to describe Roman imperialism in 
the Late Republic, and occasionally the powers of the great Republican dynasts (such as 
Octavian himself).108 Similarly, Agrippa describes aristocratic competition in a δημοκρατία in 
terms that will, by now, appear absurd to Dio’s reader. In a democracy—so he claims—the 
more wealthy, powerful, and brave men there are, the more eagerly they vie with one another 
to be foremost in serving the state, and the state in turn is magnified and improved by their 
efforts.109 Nothing could be further from the reality of Dio’s Republican narrative, where 
aristocratic competition repeatedly escalates into bribery, violence, and ultimately faction. 
Indeed, a recent analysis has even suggested that in Cassius Dio’s interpretation, excessive 
aristocratic competition was perhaps the most important driver of instability in the Late 
Republic and the main cause of its collapse.110 We might also consider Agrippa’s comparison 
of finance and taxation in ‘democracies’ and ‘tyrannies’ in the same way. He notes—again 
unrealistically—that in a δημοκρατία many make generous contributions to the treasury of their 
own free will, all eagerly vying with one another to be the most patriotic; in monarchies, on 
the other hand, individuals are selfish and consider it the job of the autocrat to provide while 
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they jealously guard their existing wealth.111 No reader of the Roman History to this point could 
believe such fantasy; Dio’s history of the Late Republic is littered with examples of 
acquisitiveness and corruption, but of conspicuous generosity toward the state there are 
none.112  
 
Agrippa thus serves two important purposes for the historian at this point in his narrative of the 
transition from Republic to Empire. First, he recapitulates the main lines of Dio’s moral and 
ethical interpretation for the collapse of the Republic. By vaunting the many alleged virtues of 
δημοκρατία, Agrippa merely reminds the reader of all the vices of the Republic just seen: 
corruption, excessive aristocratic competition, greed, and the ineffectiveness of patriotism in 
the face of ambitions dynasts and their clients. Secondly, Agrippa’s speech adds a tension 
which arises from a genuine and inescapable historical problem at this point in the unfurling of 
events. How, he asks, could Octavian’s rule ever seem anything but a tyranny? Would-be 
autocrats had arisen before—Marius, Sulla, Pompeius, Caesar—and all were now dead. By 
what means could Octavian possibly survive where they did not? Most worryingly of all, 
ambitious provincial commanders under arms would continue to pose a risk to the central 
government, as Agrippa states explicitly. Could the new regime survive these threats?  
 
The speech of Maecenas to follow provides the answer. By proposing a suite of reforms to 
combat these historical problems, Maecenas sets out Dio’s interpretation of which remedial 
measures implemented by Augustus would be the most important and effective, and in short 
paves the way for Augustus’ success. Agrippa’s oration in defence of the Republic is not 
therefore a simple ‘prelude’ or preliminary to Maecenas, as was once suggested by scholars,113 
but rather stands in dialectic with him (and consequently with Dio’s reader). As we have 
already seen, some of Maecenas’ suggestions concern relatively detailed and minute 
administrative or financial reform, and some also survey developments in the government of 
the Empire which would emerge after Augustus’ time. These suggestions obviously relate to 
the Imperial period as a whole, not to the specific historical situation in 31–27 BCE and 
Octavian’s transformation into Augustus. However, it is entirely mistaken to view all of 
Maecenas’ programme in this light. His most important recommendations for reform clearly 
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reflect Dio’s own analysis of the main reasons for the stability of Augustus’ fledgling regime 
in the early 20s BCE. 
 
A brief glance at only a few of these will demonstrate their obvious relevance to the specific 
political situation after the Battle of Actium. After his introduction Maecenas begins by 
surveying the pitfalls of Republican government. He exhorts Octavian to found not a tyranny 
but rather an enlightened monarchy, taking guidance from magistrates and advisers appointed 
on merit by Octavian himself. Maecenas argues that curtailing this fundamental aspect of the 
Republican system—elections—will hold in check the worst vices of aristocratic competition: 
craze for office (σπουδαρχία), envy (φθόνος), ambition (φιλοτιμία), and the civil strife (στάσις) 
that issues from these.114 He goes on: 
 
Democracy has all of these vices just named…they have been most frequent in our time, and there 
is now no other way to stop them. The proof of this? We have been at war, and engaged in civil 
war, for a long time now. The cause of this? The multitude of our population and the enormity of 
our affairs. For our people are diverse, and being drawn from many races and cultures they possess 
a range of temperaments and desires. These considerations have brought us to such a point that we 
can now administer our empire only with the greatest difficulty.115 
 
ταῦτα γὰρ πᾶσα μὲν δημοκρατία ἔχει· οἱ γὰρ δυνατώτεροι, τῶν τε πρωτείων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ τοὺς 
ἀσθενεστέρους μισθούμενοι, πάντα ἄνω καὶ κάτω φύρουσι· πλεῖστα δὲ δὴ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν γέγονε, καὶ 
οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄλλως παύσεται. τεκμήριον δέ, πάμπολυς ἐξ οὗ χρόνος καὶ πολεμοῦμεν καὶ 
στασιάζομεν. αἴτιον δὲ τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν πραγμάτων· ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ 
παντοδαποὶ καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰς φύσεις ὄντες καὶ ποικίλας καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχουσι, 
καὶ ταῦτα ἐς τοσοῦτον προῆκται ὥστε καὶ πάνυ δυσχερῶς ἂν διοικηθῆναι.    
 
This is certainly the historian’s own analysis of the historical situation: in his famous digression 
on the nature of democracies at the opening of Book 44, Dio writes that Rome’s outdated 
Republican system could no longer accommodate itself to the vast size of its empire.116 The 
basic point returns later in Maecenas’ speech, and surprisingly is used as justification by Dio’s 
Caesar in the harangue of his mutinying troops at Vesontio in Book 38.117 Evidently the 
historian viewed the traditional system for allocating magistracies and provincial commands—
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through election—as the midwife of competition and civil war, and Rome’s empire too large 
to be governed securely under a Republic.  
 
Chapters 19 to 23 of Maecenas’ oration set out, in detail, the historian’s interpretation of those 
reforms to the Imperial administration necessary to combat these problems and to stabilise 
Augustus’ rule. First, Augustus should revise the Senate roll, excluding members who were 
unfit and adding new worthy members, even from the provinces. “In this way”, he continues, 
“you will have many assistants and will keep an eye on the leading men from all the provinces; 
and the provinces will not rebel, because they will no longer have leaders of distinction”.118 
Second, the princeps should make all appointments himself, except for the offices of praetor 
and consul; these may remain filled by election in order to give the appearance of Republican 
government. This is because entrusting elections to the people will lead to discord and rioting, 
and entrusting them to the senators will aggrandise their ambitions.119 Third, even the offices 
of consul and praetor should be shorn of the full extent of their traditional power. The honour 
they convey to the holder should be retained but their real power reduced, in order to limit their 
capacity to rebel—in other words, “to stop the same things happening all over again” (ἵνα μὴ 
τὰ αὐτὰ αὖθις γένηται).120 Fourth, magistrates ought not to command legions during their term 
of office nor immediately afterward, but only after a sufficient hiatus. “In this way”, Maecenas 
observes astutely, “they will never be put in command of soldiers while still enjoying the 
prestige of their titles and thus be led to incite rebellions; and they will be less ambitious after 
they have spent a time as private citizens”.121 Fifth, the cursus honorum should again be 
regularised: would-be provincial governors should themselves serve as legati for other 
governors before assuming the praetorship, and should only hold the consulship after that.122 
Sixth, these officials ought all to receive a salary in payment for their services in office. Such 
a course will be both fair and limit the tendency toward corruption: for it is unjust that 
provincial governors be expected to live in a foreign land on their own resources, and they 
should not feel the need to absorb their expenses by extorting funds from the provincials they 
rule.123 Seventh, they should serve a minimum of three years in office and a maximum of five. 
The minimum, in order that they may properly learn the requirements of their role rather than 
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wasting their expertise with alternating one-year posts; the maximum, “because longer terms 
of many years in power tend very often to make officials conceited and encourage them to 
rebel”.124 Eighth and finally, it should also be forbidden for provincial governors and 
commanders to hold several important posts in succession: they will be milder if they spend 
time in the city as private citizens before moving on to their next appointment.125   
 
We have already seen that Augustus or his successors would indeed go on to implement many 
of these reforms to the provincial administration in the ensuing decades, but that is not quite 
the point here. What matters most is the historian’s decision to place this list of suggestions at 
this juncture in the narrative. These seven points constitute a plan—Dio’s plan—for ending the 
cycle of extraordinary commands, prodigious honours, rebellious governors, and ambitious 
generals that in his view caused the final crisis and collapse of the Roman Republic. With the 
Battle of Actium confirming Octavian’s unchallenged position as the leading power in Rome, 
Dio took this opportunity to pause, to explain how affairs arrived at this point in the first place, 
and how Octavian in the early 20s BCE could refashion the empire to prevent a repeat 
performance.  Maecenas’ suggestions underline the imperative for the new princeps to keep 
the traditional aristocracy—Senate, magistrates, provincial commanders and governors—
weak, and unable to challenge his power. If the new regime is to survive, it must be a military 
dictatorship, and no one individual should acquire too much power or ambition. This is 
Maecenas’ (or rather, Dio’s) answer to one of the two essential historical problems raised by 
Agrippa.  
 
Maecenas also poses a solution to the second stumbling-block interposed by Agrippa for 
Augustus’ nascent rule: the risk to his reputation. How could the young Octavian install himself 
as monarch without seeming the very image of a tyrant? Having dealt with the reality of the 
emperor’s power, Maecenas now turns to its presentation. It must indeed be a military 
dictatorship, but cloaked beneath a civilian guise. At the very opening of his speech he responds 
directly to Agrippa’s objection: Octavian should by no means set up a ‘tyranny’ (τυραννίς).126 
Rather, he should be moderate. The ideal civilis princeps must be easy of access, and 
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welcoming of frank and unrestrained advice.127 He should seek the loyalty of his subjects 
through kindness and generosity rather than compelling them to obey through fear.128 He must 
also scrupulously decline excessive and prodigious honours: these merely create the illusion of 
power while at the same time undermining it.129 As we have seen already, Dio deemed Caesar’s 
arrogance—his belief that he deserved divine honours, purple robes, and a golden throne—to 
be one of the main causes of his assassination. Maecenas proposes the means by which 
Octavian may avoid such a course. He must act, dress, and speak in the manner of an ordinary 
citizen. Even his title must be civilian: 
 
If you really do desire the reality of monarchy but fear the name of it as an accursed thing, then 
decline the title of ‘king’ and rule alone under the title of ‘Caesar’. But if you come to require other 
epithets, then the people will give you the title of imperator, just as they gave it to your father; and 
they will revere you with another way of address, so that you may reap the crop of the reality of 
kingship without the odium which attaches to the name of ‘king’.130  
  
Thus, Maecenas lays the roadmap for a successful monarchy with the appearance of civilitas 
at its core. He articulates not only Dio’s personal impression of the ideal ruler for Rome in 
general, but importantly—at this specific point in the narrative—the requisite steps for 
Octavian to secure the transition from Republic to Principate.  
 
These are precisely the steps that Octavian will go on to take in the following book.131 After 
the Agrippa-Maecenas debate, the historian devotes most of Book 53 to narrating the process 
by which Octavian’s powers were confirmed by the Senate and the most important of the 
reforms he immediately implemented. Uniquely within the historiographical tradition, Dio 
stages yet another speech of his own invention. Coming before the Senate, Octavian delivers a 
weighty address, promising to relinquish his powers and demanding that the order permit him 
to retire to a quiet life as a private citizen. It is all spin, of course: Dio writes that he proclaimed 
this refusal of power or recusatio imperii not because he genuinely wished to restore the 
Republic, but rather to appear ‘forced’ to accept monarchical powers by a Senate which could 
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not countenance his resignation.132 But the mere act of refusal is in itself an example of 
Octavian following Maecenas’ (that is, again, Dio’s) advice for solidifying his rule, putting on 
a show of refusing power and honours and behaving in the manner of an ordinary citizen.  Many 
more examples of this tactic will also follow later, with Augustus self-consciously emphasising 
his civilitas, his modesty, and his respect for the aristocracy.133 The Senate, of course, were not 
fooled as to his intentions: but having no power to stop him or little inclination to, they begged 
him to assume the leadership of the state.134  
 
At this point the Roman History summarises Augustus’ reforms to the provincial 
administration. Wishing to appear ‘Republican’ or perhaps ‘civilian’ (δημοτικός), he declared 
that he would not govern all of the provinces himself. Rather, he made some ‘senatorial’, their 
governors chosen at random and by lot from among the qualifying membership of the order, 
and others ‘imperial’, that is, under his personal jurisdiction or that of his own hand-picked 
governors.135 At a stroke he removed the potential for any one individual to use a particularly 
juicy or well-situated province, such as Gaul, as a springboard for their personal ambitions; the 
lottery would see to that. But there is more, and here Dio’s analysis is astute and incisive. 
Augustus justified this reform on the grounds that it would enable the Senate to enjoy the best 
of the empire without fear—the peaceful provinces—while he himself would take on all the 
hardship and strain of more heavily militarised provinces. Such generosity! But in fact the 
actual and intended result of this, Dio writes, was to entrust the Senate only with the weaker 
provinces, “on the pretext that these were safer and peaceful and not at war…and under this 
pretext the Senate would be unarmed and feeble, while Augustus alone would have arms and 
maintain troops”.136 True to Maecenas’ advice, Augustus’ reforms to the provincial 
administration ensured that the traditional aristocracy, including the Senate and magistrates, 
would be weak, while the emperor himself remained strong. This is the most important example 
of Augustus directly following Maecenas’ recommendations for cementing his rule in Book 
52, but there are many others that we need not detail here: accepting frank and honest advice 
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and freedom of speech;137 treating conspirators and wrongdoers mercifully;138 declining grand 
or ostentatious honours, especially statues;139 and ensuring harmonious relationships with his 
assistants and the aristocracy, curtailing their ambitions wherever possible.140 Dio’s Augustus 
follows Maecenas’ advice to the letter: in short, “in most ways he behaved toward the Romans 
as if they were free citizens”.141  
 
The Agrippa-Maecenas debate thus fulfils an important purpose not only in advocating Dio’s 
political programme for the Severan period and the proper government of the Empire in 
general, but also—crucially—in his interpretation of the decline of the Republic and the 
success of Augustus’ regime. It can hardly be read straightforwardly as a Severan political 
pamphlet, less still a generic philosophical treatise on kingship with Agrippa as a mere prelude 
to justify Maecenas’ intervention. Cassius Dio made a meaningful and deliberate decision to 
insert the controversia at this point in the historical narrative. Agrippa praises a Republic that 
no longer exists, and perhaps never existed. In so doing, he merely serves to remind Octavian 
(and, therefore, Dio’s reader) of the cesspit the res publica has become, and how far it has 
fallen from the philosophical ideal of a functioning δημοκρατία. Ironically, his speech in 
defence of the Republic merely summarises the ample justification for abandoning it. Yet 
Agrippa looks forward as well as back, positing key challenges the new regime will have to 
face. In Maecenas, Dio sets out the solution to those challenges, offering his own 
interpretation—as an historian—of the measures Augustus would have to follow in order to 
survive where Caesar did not. The Agrippa-Maecenas debate is a remarkably sophisticated 
historical analysis of Octavian’s position in the aftermath of the Battle of Actium. The narrative 
of Books 50 to 53 of the Roman History, charting the final stage in the bloody transition from 




Almost half a century after the Battle of Actium, its victor Octavian—now Augustus—lay 
dying. By 14 CE, Rome had enjoyed decades of relative internal cohesion and stability. Dio 
was not fooled by the idealistic claims of the new regime, immortalised in the emperor’s Res 
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138 Cass. Dio 53.24.4–6, 54.15.4–8, 54.23.1–4; 55.7.2–3, 55.22.1–2.  
139 Cass. Dio 53.27.3; 54.1–2, 54.25.3, 54.27.2, 54.35.2. 
140 Cass. Dio 53.23.3–4, 53.27.3–4, 53.32.3–4; 54.22.4. 
141 Cass. Dio 53.33.1. 
Gestae, his now-lost memoirs, and the output of the Augustan poets.142 There were pretenders 
and challenges to the emperor’s power: Dio records the ambitions of provincial governors such 
as Marcus Primus and Cornelius Gallus,143 or populists at home like the aedile Egnatius 
Rufus.144 There was competition and discord: when Augustus attempted to fill the consular 
posts of 22 and 19 BCE by free election, the people fell to rioting and violence.145 And there 
were inevitably plots against his rule: the most elaborate example in the Roman History is an 
alleged conspiracy of L. Cornelius Cinna Magnus, lavishly dramatised in the private dialogue 
between Livia and Augustus on the need to be merciful to wrong-doers in Book 55.146 But none 
of these threats weakened the Imperial centre to perdition. Ambitious governors were tried and 
replaced; the elections ceased and were replaced by personal appointments; plots failed in their 
objects, partly thanks to the oft-forgotten repressiveness of Augustus’ military dictatorship. 
Octavian had not only vanquished Antonius and Cleopatra: he had survived.  
 
After Actium, there was really no way back. That at least is Dio’s view of the matter, expressed 
(as so often) in his speech of Maecenas. “Who”, Maecenas asks, “will spare you if you give 
your powers back to the people or entrust them to another, when you have injured so many 
people and practically all of these will aim for supreme power for themselves?”.147 The wise 
advisor is unequivocal and gives as examples the major dynasts of the last century. Pompeius 
gave up his extraordinary powers after returning from the East with his loyal army in 62 BCE: 
he lost his pre-eminent position and, eventually, his life. Marius and Sulla would certainly have 
suffered the same fate, had they not died first. As for Caesar, when he had defeated his enemies 
there was no option but to press on. He could not march back over the Rubicon; it was done.148 
Maecenas voices Dio’s firm historical view that Octavian, too, could not make a second 
crossing. It was essential for him to seize this opportunity to solidify his position after Actium; 
he could not back down now. The stake had been raised to life and death, and Octavian had a 
winning hand. 
 
142 At 53.19 the historian shows his awareness of the regime’s penchant toward secrecy and the necessity of 
dissimulation and cover-ups to keep it secure. Ando 2016 has recently given a fine analysis of the Agrippa-
Maecenas debate from this perspective, using it to show Dio’s awareness of the profound (and eventually 
deligitimising) disconnect between the reality of the emperor’s power and the falsity of its presentation.  
143 Cass. Dio 53.23.5–7; 54.3. On Gallus’ monumental stela and his ambitions in Egypt, see Minas-Nerpel & 
Pfeiffer 2010.  
144 Cass. Dio 53.24.4–6; see Philipps 1997.  
145 Cass. Dio 54.6, 54.10.  
146 On the oft-forgotten plots against Augustus’ rule, see Vio 200.   
147 Cass. Dio 52.17.2.  
148 Cass. Dio 52.17.3–4.  
 Octavian played it and lived. But within the interpretative arc of the Roman History, this 
success would have been impossible without the Agrippa-Maecenas debate of Book 52. 
Agrippa’s valiant but doomed final defence of the Republic maintains a delicate balance: by 
praising an idealised δημοκρατία which no longer exists, Agrippa’s speech must summarise 
Dio’s view of how dramatically the res publica has degenerated from a positive form while at 
the same time appearing to give a genuine defence of the status quo. The result is unconvincing, 
but that of course was precisely the historian’s intention and is aided by the deliberate, even 
artful, contrast he sets up between the ideal of the speech and the reality of the narrative. 
Maecenas, on the other hand, explains that a different Rome was possible. It was neither 
necessary nor inevitable that Augustus’ monarchy be a tyranny. At this dramatic point of 
transition in the history of Rome, Octavian could either turn back and follow the fate of his 
predecessors, or press on and forge the most stable possible monarchy: a strong central 
government sustained by military force, legitimised by popular and aristocratic approval, 
tempered by clemency and virtue, and cloaked in a humble and civilian guise. Full house.  
 
The importance of Maecenas’—that is, Dio’s—programme for Augustus’ fledgling monarchy 
is underlined upon the emperor’s death. The contribution of Agrippa and Maecenas to the 
stability of the new emperor’s rule, and therefore to the historian’s interpretation of its success, 
is emphasised in the funeral oration of his successor, Tiberius. Praising the virtues of Rome’s 
first princeps, Tiberius reflects upon the excellence of Augustus’ rule and the role played by 
his most loyal advisors, Agrippa and Maecenas, in creating it:  
 
So for the reasons I have just mentioned, you deemed this man worthy of the title of Augustus. As 
his first act after ridding himself of civil war—in which his actions and experiences were not what 
he himself wanted, but what heaven ordained—he chose to spare the lives of most of the enemies 
who had survived his battles. He thus chose not to follow the precedent of Sulla, who was called 
Felix or The Fortunate. There is no need to recount all of them by name: for who does not know 
about Sosius, Scaurus the brother of Sextus, and especially Lepidus, who continued to live long 
after his defeat and served as high priest for the remainder of his life? And even though Augustus 
honoured his companions with many great gifts, he did not allow them to do anything arrogant or 
violent. You know perfectly well the various men in this category, especially Maecenas and 
Agrippa, and I need not continue to enumerate them further.149  
 
 
149 Cass. Dio 56.38.  
ὁ τοίνυν Αὔγουστος οὗτος, ὃν δι᾽ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῆς ἐπωνυμίας ταύτης ἠξιώσατε, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα 
τῶν ἐμφυλίων πολέμων ἀπηλλάγη καὶ πράξας καὶ παθὼν οὐχ ὅσα αὐτὸς ἤθελεν ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα τῷ 
δαιμονίῳ ἔδοξεν, πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς πλείους τῶν ἀντιστάντων οἱ καὶ περιγενομένων ἐκ τῶν 
παρατάξεων ἔσωσεν, ἐν μηδενὶ τὸν Σύλλαν μιμησάμενος τὸν εὐτυχῆ ὀνομαζόμενον. και ἵνα μὴ 
πάντας αὐτοὺς καταλέγω, τίς οὐκ οἶδε τὸν Σόσσιον, τίς τὸν Σκαῦρον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Σέξτου, τίς 
τὸν Λέπιδον αὐτόν, ὃς καὶ ἐπεβίω τοσοῦτον τῇ ἥττῃ χρόνον καὶ ἀρχιέρεως διὰ παντὸς αὐτοῦ ὢν 
διετέλεσεν; ἔπειτα δὲ τοὺς συνεξετασθέντας οἱ πολλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις δωρεαῖς τιμήσας οὔθ᾽ 
ὑπερήφανόν τι πράττειν οὔθ᾽ ὑβρίζειν εἴασεν. ἀλλ᾽ ἴστε γὰρ ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τούς τε ἄλλους 
καὶ τὸν Μαικἠναν καὶ τὸν Ἀγρίππαν, ὥστε με μηδὲν μηδὲ τούτους ἐξαριθμήσασθαι δεῖσθαι. 
 
Agrippa and Maecenas thus feature prominently at the beginning of Augustus’ rule and at its 
end. But throughout the narrative of his reign, their interactions with the emperor additionally 
give Dio an opportunity to show the civilis princeps following their advice, and succeeding in 
his objects by that means. Whenever they enter the scene, Augustus is presented as following 
carefully Maecenas’ programme for the ‘good emperor’.   
 
On the one hand, Agrippa serves to show the emperor’s magnanimity, humanity, and his respect 
for competent advisors. Thus in a list of Agrippa’s many building works and public 
benefactions, Dio notes that he not only enjoyed a life free from envy despite his great position, 
but was even praised and honoured by the emperor: “the reason for this was that he consulted 
and cooperated with Augustus in the most humane, celebrated, and beneficial endeavours, and 
yet did not arrogate to himself any glory for them”.150 When Agrippa died, the historian opines 
that he had shown himself the most noble of men, and was honoured unstintingly by the emperor 
for his excellence. As for the inheritance he left to the emperor, the latter generously distributed 
it to the people in Agrippa’s name.151 It is ironic and deliberate that Agrippa, whose speech 
argues that it is impossible to find a patriotic statesman under a monarchy, becomes the ideal 
citizen under Augustus’ rule.  
 
On the other hand, Maecenas continues to fill the function he served in Book 52: that of the 
wise and honest counsellor, unafraid to speak to truth to a temperate and forgiving monarch.  
When the emperor was on the verge of sentencing men to death, Dio records that Maecenas 
publicly interposed himself and convinced him otherwise. Augustus, far from being displeased, 
was glad: “because whenever he was given over to unfitting passion as a result of his own nature 
 
150 Cass. Dio 53.23.4. 
151 Cass. Dio 54.29.4. 
or the stress of his affairs, he was set right by the honesty of his friends”.152 Satisfyingly, the 
interactions between Augustus, Agrippa, and Maecenas demonstrate in action those virtues 
which Maecenas’ speech charged the new emperor to possess and which Agrippa predicted he 
could not: clemency, tolerance, humility, trust, and magnanimity.  
 
The elaborate controversia of Book 52 is therefore a very special piece of eloquence, unique in 
the Greek historiography of the Roman Empire. We have seen here that one important function 
of the debate is to reflect on the ills of the Severan period. Living in an age of instability, 
dynastic struggles, and occasional tyrannies, Dio took this opportunity in his narrative to reflect 
upon the character of the ideal emperor for Rome in two set-piece speeches, drawing several 
arguments from the Greek tradition of kingship literature. To that reflection he appended 
concrete and often sophisticated suggestions for reform in the early third century CE. Dio’s 
administrative and financial proposals—some of which would not be fully realised until long 
after his time—demonstrate his statecraft, his attention to detail, and his clear wish to make a 
contemporary political point with the debate. However, most aspects of the programme for 
Imperial government set out by Maecenas in fact list institutional, political, provincial, and 
administrative changes once put in place by Augustus or his successors. It cannot, therefore, be 
a straightforward a ‘call to arms’ for a Severan audience. Rather, it surveys the development of 
Imperial rule over the longue durée, and invites the contemporary reader to reflect upon what 
had until relatively recently been the building-blocks of Rome’s imperial stability.    
 
Yet none of this suggests that the Agrippa-Maecenas debate was a mere political pamphlet, 
dropped into the text the moment the appropriate dramatic situation occurred. Dio was not, in 
fact, ‘on the watch’ for the first plausible moment to insert an anachronistic tirade against the 
state of his contemporary world.153 The speeches of Book 52 belong inextricably to his 
historical explanation of the transition from Republic to Principate. Indeed, they are so essential 
to his method that the overarching interpretation of Books 50–56—encompassing Octavian’s 
rise, his war against Antonius, the means by which he confirmed his monarchy, and made it 
successful thereafter—would make little sense without them. They offer an important analysis 
of Octavian’s historical position in the wake of the Battle of Actium, each summarising the 
 
152 Cass. Dio 55.7.2–3.  
153 So wrongly Fomin 2015, 17: “[there are] some justifications for doubting that Dio’s book fifty-two should be 
read as a serious excursus into the motivations and cause-and-effect relations of a historical context that is 
characterized by major change in political structure”.  
risks to his position should he assume a monarchy (Agrippa) or reject it (Maecenas). The risks 
were great indeed. Agrippa and Maecenas offer a tantalising counterfactual possibility: a history 
in which Octavian came to be seen as a tyrant and suffered the same fate as his adoptive father, 
was dethroned by a provincial governor at the head of a loyal army, fell at the hands of plotters 
against his rule, or perhaps laid down his powers after all and was assassinated. None of these 
eventualities came to pass. Maecenas articulates, point by point, the historian’s own 
interpretation of the measures necessary for Augustus to anticipate and neutralise these hazards, 
all of which the princeps will indeed go on to implement in the narrative to follow. He outlines 
a suite of changes to the distribution of power within the empire, designed to keep the emperor 
strong and his challengers weak. But Maecenas (or rather Dio’s) vision for Augustus’ success 
was not simply a stratocratic despotism. Constructing the archetype of civilitas, Dio’s speaker 
gives a detailed overview of the virtuous means by which Augustus was to secure acceptance 
and even celebration of his rule; to make himself a god not in the manner of a Hellenistic tyrant, 
but in the hearts and minds of his people. It is a gross mistake to be too sentimental about 
Augustus, and Cassius Dio certainly was not. He simply knew a capable monarch when he saw 
one—and Agrippa and Maecenas pave the forward road for Octavian to become one. Besides, 
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